EEL 5764: Graduate Computer Architecture Storage Ann Cordon-Ross

Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Florida

http://www.ann.ece.ufl.edu/

These slides are provided by: David Patterson Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences, University of California, Berkeley Modifications/additions have been made from the originals

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Case for Storage

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- · Compiler determines what architecture to use
- · OS determines the storage
- Different focus and critical issues
 - If a program crashes, just restart program, user is mildly annoyed
 If data is lost, users are very angry
- Also has own performance theory—queuing theory—balances throughput vs. response time

Outline

- Magnetic Disks
- RAID in the past
- · RAID in the present
- Advanced Dependability/Reliability/Availability
- I/O Benchmarks, Performance and Dependability
- Intro to Queueing Theory









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Arrays (1987) Conventional: 4 disk designs (4 product teams): 10" 3.5" 5.25" \square Low end -> high end (main frame) Disk array: 1 disk design 3.5" But is there a catch??

Manufacturing Advantages of Disk

Arrays of Disks to Close the Performance Gap (1988 disks) Replace small number of large disks with a large number of small disks IBM 3380 Smaller disk Smaller disk x50 Data Ca

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Data Capacity	7.5 GBytes	320 MBytes	16 GBytes				
Volume	24 cu. ft.	0.2 cu. ft.	20 cu. ft				
Power	1.65 KW	10 W	0.5 KW				
Data Rate	12 MB/s	2 MB/s	100 MB/s				
I/O Rate	200 I/Os/s	40 I/Os/s	2000 I/Os/s				
Cost	\$100k	\$2k	\$100k				
Data arrays have potential for – Large data and I/O rates – High MB per cu. ft – High MB per KW							
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Array Reliability		
Reliability of N disks = Reliability of 1 Disk ÷ N • 50,000 Hours ÷ 70 disks = 700 hours • Disk system MTTF: Drops from 6 years to 1 month! Arrays (without redundancy) too unreliable to be useful!		
Originally concerned with performance, I ecame an issue	but reliability	





Redundancy via Mirroring/Shadowing Redundancy via EEC (Level 2 RAID) (Level 1 RAID) Data Disks Redundant ("Check") Disks · Each disk is fully duplicated onto its "mirror" Very high availability can be achieved Bandwidth sacrifice on write: Logical write = two physical writes · Reads may be optimized 1+Log n disks Most expensive solution: 100% capacity overhead Used idea of error correction codes from memory and applied to disks. Parity is calculated over subsets of disks, and you can figure out which disk failed and correct it. Single error correction 11/19/07 11/19/07 16



Inspiration for RAID 4

- RAID 3 relies on parity disk to discover errors on Read
- · But every sector has an error detection field
- To catch errors on read, rely on error detection field on the disk vs. the parity disk
- Allows independent reads to different disks simultaneously

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Define:

- Small read/write read/write to one disk
- Large read/write read/write to more than one disk















Berkeley History: RAID-I

- RAID-I (1989)

 Consisted of a Sun 4/280 workstation with 128 MB of DRAM, four dual-string SCSI controllers, 28 5.25-inch SCSI disks and
- specialized disk striping software • Today RAID is \$24 billion dollar industry, 80% nonPC disks sold in RAIDs





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Definitions examples on why precise definitions so important for clability. e Confusion between different communities e Sa programming mistake a fault, error, or failure? Are we talking about the time it was designed or the time the program is run? If the running program doesn't exercise the mistake, is tstill a fault/error/failure? If an alpha particle hits a DRAM memory cell, is it a fault/error/failure if the doesn't change the value? Is it a fault/error/failure if the memory doesn't access the changed bit? Did a fault/error/failure still occur if the memory had error correction and delivered the corrected value to the CPU?

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IFIP Standard terminology

- Computer system <u>dependability</u>: quality of delivered service such that reliance can be placed on service
- <u>Service</u> is observed <u>actual behavior</u> as perceived by other system(s) interacting with this system's users
- Each module has ideal <u>specified behavior</u>, where <u>service</u> <u>specification</u> is agreed description of expected behavior
- A system <u>failure</u> occurs when the actual behavior deviates from the specified behavior
- · failure occurred because an error, a defect in module
- · The cause of an error is a fault
- When a fault occurs it creates a <u>latent error</u>, which becomes <u>effective</u> when it is activated
- When error actually affects the delivered service, a failure occurs (time from error to failure is <u>error latency</u>)

Fault v. (Latent) Error v. Failure An error is manifestation *in the system* of a fault, a failure is manifestation *on the service* of an error If an alpha particle hits a DRAM memory cell, is it a fault/error/failure if it doesn't change the value? Is it a fault/error/failure if the memory doesn't access the changed bit? Did a fault/error/failure still occur if the memory had error correction and delivered the corrected value to the CPU? An alpha particle hitting a DRAM can be a fault if it changes the memory, it creates an error error remains latent until effected memory word is read if the effected word error affects the delivered service, a failure occurs

Fault Categories

- 1. Hardware faults: Devices that fail, such alpha particle hitting a memory cell
- 2. Design faults: Faults in software (usually) and hardware design (occasionally)
- 3. Operation faults: Mistakes by operations and maintenance personnel
- 4. Environmental faults: Fire, flood, earthquake, power failure, and sabotage
- Also by duration:
- 1. <u>Transient faults</u> exist for limited time and not recurring
- 2. Intermittent faults cause a system to oscillate between faulty and fault-free operation
- 3. Permanent faults do not correct themselves over time

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Fault Tolerance vs Disaster Tolerance

- Fault-Tolerance (or more properly, Error-Tolerance): mask local faults (prevent errors from becoming failures)
 - RAID disks
 - Uninterruptible Power Supplies
 - Cluster Failover
- Disaster Tolerance: masks site errors (prevent site errors from causing service failures) - Could wipe everything out
- Protects against fire, flood, sabotage,...
- Redundant system and service at remote site.
- Use design diversity

From Jim Gray's "Talk at UC Berkeley on Fault Tolerance " 11/9/00 11/19/07





HW Failures in Real Systems: Tertiary Disks • 20 PC cluster in seven 7-foot high, 19-inch wide racks • 368 8.4 GB, 7200 RPM, 3.5-inch IBM disks • P6-200MHz with 96 MB of DRAM each

- FreeBSD 3.0
- connected via switched 100 Mbit/second Ethernet

Component	Total in System	Total Failed	% Failed
SCSI Controller	44	1	2.3%
SCSI Cable	39	1	2.6%
SCSI Disk	368	7	1.9%
IDE Disk	24	6	25.0%
Disk Enclosure -Backplane	46	13	28.3%
Disk Enclosure - Power Supply	92	3	3.3%
Ethernet Controller	20	1	5.0%
Ethernet Switch	2	1	50.0%
Ethernet Cable	42	1	2.3%
CPU/Motherboard	20	0	0%
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Does Hardware Fail Fast? 4 of 384 Disks that failed in Tertiary Disk

There were early warnings in the logs! Could just monitor logs.

Messages in system log for failed disk	No. log msgs	Duration (hours)
Hardware Failure (Peripheral device write fault [for] Field Replaceable Unit)	1763	186
Not Ready (Diagnostic failure: ASCQ = Component ID [of] Field Replaceable Unit)	1460	90
Recovered Error (Failure Prediction Threshold Exceeded [for] Field Replaceable Unit)	1313	5
Recovered Error (Failure Prediction Threshold Exceeded [for] Field Replaceable Unit)	431	17
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Quantifyi	ng /	Availat	oility	
System Type	Una	wailable	Availability	Availability
Unmanaged	(II	50.000	90 %	1
Managed		5,000	99.%	2
Well Managed		500	99.9%	3
Fault Tolerant		50	99.99%	4
High-Availability		5	99.999%	5
Very-High-Availability		.5	99.9999%	6
Ultra-Availability		.05	99.99999%	7
UnAvailabilit	$\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{N}$	MTTR/N	ATBF	
can cut	it in ¹ /	² bv cutt	ing MTTR o	r MTBF
From Jim Gray's "Talk at UC Berkele 11/19/07	y on Fault Ta	lerance = 11/9/00		

How Realistic is "5 Nines"?	
 HP claims HP-9000 server HW and HP-UX OS can deliver 99.999% availability guarantee "in certain pre-defined, pre-tested customer environments" Application faults? Operator faults? 	
 Environmental faults? Collocation sites (lots of computers in 1 building on Internet) have 	
 1 network outage per year (~1 day) 1 power failure per year (~1 day) 	
 Microsoft Network unavailable for a day due to problem in Domain Name Server: if only outage per year, 99.7% or 2 Nines 	
 Needed 250 years of interruption free service to meet their target "nines" 	
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I/O Benchmarks: TP1 by Anon et. al

 Scalability 	ity requirement				
-Who cares if you can get 1M/sec (TPS) on a single record					
-Need to scale number of records with total transactions					
TPS	Number of ATMs	Account-file size			
10	1,000	0.1 GB			
100	10,000	1.0 GB			
1,000	100,000	10.0 GB			
10,000	1,000,000	100.0 GB			
– Each input TPS =>100,000 account records, 10 branches, 100 ATMs					
Response time					
-Not all transaction have to happen under the threshold					
– 95% transactions take ≤ 1 second					
Price factored in					
(initial nurchase price + 5 year maintenance = cost of ownership)					
-(initial purchase price + 5 year maintenance - cost of ownership)					
 Hire auditor to certify results 					
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Unusual Characteristics of TPC

· Price is included in the benchmarks - cost of HW, SW, and 5-year maintenance agreements

- included ⇒ price-performance as well as performance
- The data set generally must scale in size as the throughput increases
 - trying to model real systems
 - demand on system size of the data stored
- · The benchmark results are audited Must be approved by certified TPC auditor, who enforces TPC rules ⇒ only fair results are submitted

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- Throughput is the performance metric but response times are limited
- eg, TPC-C: 90% transaction response times < 5 seconds An independent organization maintains the benchmarks
- COO ballots on changes, meetings, to settle disputes..

Availability benchmark methodology · Goal: quantify variation in QoS metrics as events occur that affect system availability · Use fault injection to compromise system hardware faults (disk, memory, network, power) software faults (corrupt input, driver error returns) maintenance events (repairs, SW/HW upgrades) · Example: Inject error and see how RAID handled it 11/19/07





- Linux: favors performance over data availability
 automatically-initiated reconstruction, idle bandwidth
 - virtually no performance impact on application
 - very long window of vulnerability (>1hr for 3GB RAID)
- · Solaris: favors data availability over app. perf.
 - automatically-initiated reconstruction at high BW
 - as much as 34% drop in application performance
 - short window of vulnerability (10 minutes for 3GB)
- Windows: favors neither!
 - manually-initiated reconstruction at moderate BW
 - as much as 18% app. performance drop
 - somewhat short window of vulnerability (23 min/3GB)

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Characterizing distribution of a random variable

- Need mean time and a measure of variance
- For mean, use weighted arithmetic mean (WAM):
- f_i = frequency of task i
- Ti = time for tasks I
- weighted arithmetic mean = f1×T1 + f2×T2 + ... + fn×Tn
- For variance, instead of standard deviation, use
- Variance (square of standard deviation) for WAM: • Variance = $(f_1 \times T_1^2 + f_2 \times T_2^2 + \dots + f_n \times T_n^2) - WAM^2$
- Problem If time is miliseconds, Variance units are square milliseconds!?!?
- Got a unitless measure of variance?

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- Most widely used exponential distribution is Poisson
- Described by probability mass function: Probability (k) = e^{-a} x a^k / k!
 - where a = Rate of events x Elapsed time
- If interarrival times are exponentially distributed & use arrival rate from above for rate of events, then the number of arrivals in time interval *t* is a *Poisson process*

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Time in Queue

- All tasks in queue (Length_{queue}) ahead of new task must be completed before task can be serviced
 - Each task takes on average Time_{server}
 - Task at server takes average residual service time to complete
- Chance server is busy is server utilization
 ⇒ expected time for service is Server utilization × Average
 residual service time
- Time_{queue} = Length_{queue} x Time_{server} + Server utilization x Average residual service time
- Substituting definitions for ${\rm Length}_{\rm queue,}$ Average residual service time, & rearranging:

Time_{queue} = Time_{server} x Server utilization/(1-Server utilization)

So, given a set of I/O requests, you can determine how many disks you need

M/M/1 Queuing Model

- System is in equilibrium
- Times between 2 successive requests arriving, "interarrival times", are exponentially distributed
- Number of sources of requests is unlimited
- Server can start next job immediately
- Single queue, no limit to length of queue, and FIFO discipline, so all tasks in line must be completed
- There is one server
- Called M/M/1 (book also derives M/M/m)
- 1. Exponentially random request arrival ($C^2 = 1$) 2. Exponentially random service time (C² = 1)
- 3. 1 server
- $\ensuremath{\textit{M}}$ standing for Markov, mathematician who defined and analyzed the memoryless processes



